Fed+47-51

**Following are a series of questions, followed immediately by the answer, a phrase from the Federalist papers. Paraphrase the answer into plain English, and be ready to share your answer with the class.** **2. How will government powers be kept separate?** **3. How will government powers be kept separate?** **4. How will government powers be kept separate?** **5. How will government powers be kept separate?** **6. How will government powers be kept separate?** **7. How will government powers be kept separate?** **8. How will government powers be kept separate?** **9. How will government powers be kept separate?** **10.****How will government powers be kept separate?**
 * Federalist 47-51**
 * 1. Why Separation of powers and checks and balances? **
 * The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.
 * Unless, these departments be so far connected and blended as to give to each a constitutional control over the others, the degree of separation which the maxim requires, as essential to a free government, can never in practice be duly maintained.
 * the powers properly belonging to one of the departments ought not to be directly and completely administered by either of the other departments. None of them ought to possess, directly or indirectly, an overruling influence over the others, in the administration of their respective powers.
 * After discriminating, therefore, in theory, the several classes of power, as they may in their nature be legislative, executive, or judiciary, The most difficult task is to provide some practical security for each, against the invasion of the others. What this security ought to be, is the great problem to be solved.
 * that a mere demarcation on parchment of the constitutional limits of the several departments, is not a sufficient guard against those encroachments which lead to a tyrannical concentration of all the powers of government in the same hands.
 * The only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places.
 * it is evident that each department should have a will of its own; that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others.
 * that the members of each department should be as little dependent as possible on those of the others, for the emoluments annexed to their offices.Were the executive magistrate, or the judges, not independent of the legislature in this particular, their independence in every other would be merely nominal
 * great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others.
 * Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary.
 * In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.
 * A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.

**11.****How will government powers be kept separate?**
 * Supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public.Divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other that the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights.

**12.****How will government powers be kept separate?**
 * divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will admit.
 * //Government powers will be kept separate by dividing the branches so that the electing of officials is done by different designations and so that there is dissimilar philosphies in each of their actions; their association, and their functions with one another must be as limited as possible as society will admit.- L.Martinez//

**13.****How will government powers be kept separate?**
 * It may even be necessary to guard against dangerous encroachments by still further precautions.. . . weakness of the executive may require, on the other hand, that it should be fortified. An absolute negative on the legislature . . . would be neither altogether safe nor alone sufficient.

**14.****How will government powers be kept separate?**
 * May not this defect of an absolute negative be supplied by some qualified connection between [the executive} and the [Senate], by which the [Senate] may be led to support the constitutional rights of the [executive], without being too much detached from the rights of its own department?

**15.****Why is the judiciary an exception to this?**
 * first, because peculiar qualifications being essential in the members, the primary consideration ought to be to select that mode of choice which best secures these qualifications;
 * secondly, because the permanent tenure by which the appointments are held in that department, must soon destroy all sense of dependence on the authority conferring them.

**16.****Summarize the arguments for separation of powers ** > > > **17.****Which branch is the most powerful and therefore dangerous?** **18.****Discuss arguments for a federal system.**
 * In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates
 * First. In a single republic, [like Britain]all the power surrendered by the people is submitted to the administration of a single government; and the usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government into distinct and separate departments.
 * In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.

**19.****Discuss arguments for a federal system.**
 * It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part.
 * Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.

**20.****Arguments for Federalism**

Sumamry: **21.****Explain how the following structures are designed to protect liberty and control the power of the majority** Separation of Powers:
 * There are but two methods of providing against this evil:
 * By comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable.
 * society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority.
 * the one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority that is, of the society itself;

__ Checks and balances: __

Federalism

__ Principles protected


 * Limited Government
 * __ Popular Sovereignty __
 * Constitutionalism
 * __ Rule of Law __
 * Constitutionalism
 * __ Rule of Law __